

Remuneration Report

The Board of Directors presents its Remuneration Report for the year ended 31 December 2006, which includes a proposed new remuneration policy effective from 1 January 2007. A resolution to approve this Report will be put to shareholders at the Annual General Meeting on 19 April 2007.

REMUNERATION COMMITTEE

The Board has established a Remuneration Committee (the “Committee”) which is responsible for setting each executive Director’s remuneration. The Committee’s current terms of reference were adopted on 25 February 2004 and are available on the Company’s website or from the Group Company Secretary.

The Committee is comprised of three non-executive Directors, Adam Applegarth (Chairman), David Thompson and Neil Davidson, all of whom the Board considers to be independent. Adam Applegarth was appointed to the Committee on 21 April 2006, the date that Hamish Leslie Melville, the previous Chairman, retired from the Committee.

During the year the Committee sought independent advice from New Bridge Street Consultants LLP (“NBSC”), who are leading advisors on executive remuneration. In addition, the Committee consulted with the Chairman and the Group Chief Executive, although neither participated in any discussion relating to their own remuneration. NBSC do not provide any other service to the Company.

REMUNERATION REVIEW

At the time of the introduction of the Synergy Incentive Plan in January 2006, several of the Company’s leading institutional shareholders encouraged the Company to review the current remuneration policy for executive Directors, with a view to bringing it more into line with market practice for a FTSE 100 company. In particular, several shareholders felt strongly that the policy should be adjusted so as to provide for a proportionately higher level of reward for long-term value creation, so as to avoid the need to resort to arrangements like the one-off Synergy Incentive Plan in the future.

Although the previous policy complemented the excellent performance of the Company, the Group has grown significantly since the last remuneration policy was introduced in 2001 (following a full investor consultation). In addition, the size and shape of the Board has changed significantly over the past two years, with the retirement of the former Chairman, Duncan Davidson, the founder of the Company, the change of role of John White from Chief Executive to Executive Chairman and the promotion of Mike Farley to Chief Executive. Finally, the corporate governance environment has changed substantially since that time.

In the light of the above, the Committee considered that the time was right to carry out a detailed review and it is anticipated that the new policy, which will take effect from 1 January 2007, will not need any significant adjustment for the foreseeable future. As part of the review, the Committee has benchmarked the existing executive Directors’ remuneration packages primarily against a set of companies either side of Persimmon in the FTSE 100 (20 above and 20 below) ranked by market capitalisation. Although the Committee considers that this is a reasonable comparator group, it is aware that Persimmon’s current level of pre-tax profitability is significantly higher than the vast majority of these companies.

The executive Directors have been responsible for delivering very significant value to investors through organic growth and seamless integration of several acquisitions and this proven track record makes this team attractive to quoted competitors and private equity backed businesses. The Committee considers that it is important that these executive Directors are appropriately rewarded for continuing to deliver exceptional value to shareholders and to retain their expertise.

The review of remuneration highlighted the following issues with the current remuneration policy compared to other FTSE 100 companies of a similar size:

- Basic salaries are significantly below market levels.
- The level of bonus payable for target performance is much higher. Whilst recognising that the Company has been an excellent performer and bonuses, historically, have paid out close to or at the maximum level, the bonus plan’s structure has been unusual in that the proportion of the bonus payable at target has been relatively high, at around 80 – 90% of the maximum bonus payable (albeit the target level of performance determined by the Committee for annual bonus purposes has been relatively challenging). In addition, the difference to the level of bonus payout is relatively small in relation to different levels of performance.
- Long Term Incentive Plan awards are generally just above lower quartile (reflecting both a relatively low grant multiple which is referenced off a relatively low basic salary).

REMUNERATION POLICY

The overriding objective has been to redesign the packages so they are more closely aligned with market standards and best practice, in particular a more market related basic salary and a more conventionally structured annual bonus plan. However, we recognise that some aspects of the current remuneration package, in particular the higher than typical emphasis on variable pay, has helped to drive the excellent performance of the Company.

Accordingly, the re-design has sought to incorporate some of the key principles of the existing pay philosophy (particularly the focus on performance related pay and annual bonus). At the same time the re-design seeks to incorporate a greater reward potential in the package for longer term value creation, subject to more stretching annual bonus and long term incentive plan performance conditions.

The proposed changes to the policy should be viewed in a total remuneration context (taking together the value of basic pay, pension, annual bonus and long term incentives). Under this approach, where there are increases proposed to one element of the package this may be offset by a reduction to one or more other elements of the package. For instance, despite some substantial increases to the level of basic salary, the level of target bonus potential has been reduced significantly and the targets attached to both plans have been made significantly more demanding.

The overall impact of the changes on the target value of the executive Directors' remuneration packages can be summarised as follows:

- John White's package has not changed materially.
- Mike Farley's package has increased so as to equalise it with that of John White, as he now has full CEO responsibilities. This approach is recognised as being transitional, until such time as John White begins to step back from full time executive duties, when his remuneration would, of course, reduce commensurately. At the current time, the Committee is satisfied that these two very highly rated executives should be paid at market competitive rates for a company chief executive. John White brings a wealth of experience of the sector and knowledge of the Company which, particularly since Duncan Davidson retired, the Board considered essential for the Company to retain.
- Mike Killoran's package has increased. This increase is considered appropriate, recognising his outstanding ability, track record and the broader corporate finance element to his role compared to many other finance directors.
- David Bryant's package has not increased substantially.
- Overall, the total employment cost of the Executive Board (taking account of all of the elements of the package) is less than in 2005 (despite a large increase in the size and complexity of the business).

The Committee believes that it is essential that this talented management team is retained and appropriately rewarded for continuing to deliver outstanding shareholder value. This is, without doubt in our mind, an exceptional management team and the Committee is comfortable with the principle that their remuneration should also potentially be exceptional, provided that the performance related pay elements of the package are triggered. To ensure that such rewards will only continue to be payable for ongoing excellent performance, a higher than usual (by market standards) proportion of the package will continue to be weighted in favour of performance related pay; around two thirds of the package will be performance related compared to the FTSE 100 average of around 55%. In this way, if the level of performance reduces in the future, the value of the packages will reduce more sharply than in most FTSE 100 companies.

The Committee has considered this review carefully and is satisfied that the proposed changes are more in line with market practice whilst creating a sharper and more performance orientated remuneration package, building on the value already created for shareholders.

In addition to changing the mix between the various components of the package, some changes are proposed to the structure of the annual bonus and long term incentive plan awards. Full details of both the quantum of the individual components of the packages and the structure of annual bonus, long term incentive awards and pension provision, are summarised below.

BASIC SALARY

The basic salaries for 2006 were set by the Committee as at 1 January 2005 and were fixed for two years until 31 December 2006, except for Mike Farley's salary, which increased when he took up his role as Group Chief Executive in April 2006.

As part of the package of proposed changes to the remuneration policy, basic salaries will be increased to a broadly market median level, by reference to other FTSE 100 companies of a similar size.

Basic salaries for 2007 are proposed as follows (2005 and 2006 salary level in brackets):

John White	£615,000	(£430,000)
Mike Farley	£615,000	(£400,000*)
Mike Killoran	£400,000	(£320,000)
David Bryant	£265,000	(£235,000)

*from April 2006

ANNUAL BONUS

Annual bonuses will be performance related and non-pensionable.

The Committee has determined that the total level of potential annual bonus payable to the executive Directors will be capped at a predetermined figure, which varies by Director.

Maximum annual bonus potential for 2007 (as a percentage of salary) will be as follows (2006 maximum bonus level in brackets):

John White	250%	(431%)
Mike Farley	250%	(375%)
Mike Killoran	250%	(292%)
David Bryant	175%	(220%)

The balance of any 2006 bonus earned in excess of 200% of basic salary is required to be invested in the Company's shares ("Bonus Shares"), which vest in two equal tranches over a two year period. Recognising the increase in basic salary levels for 2007, the threshold will be reduced from 200% to 150% for 2007 annual bonuses. It is worth noting that the executive Directors already have significant shareholdings.

Bonus Shares are awarded at the same time as the cash bonus, with the first tranche vesting on the date of announcement of the Group's preliminary results in the following year and the second tranche on the date of announcement of the Group's preliminary results the year after. Any unvested Bonus Shares would be forfeited on termination of employment if the executive Director resigns or is dismissed summarily.

The number of Bonus Shares awarded for 2006 was calculated by dividing the balance of any bonus earned in excess of 200% of basic salary by the average share price in the period 1 January to 14 February prior to the announcement of the Group's preliminary results.

The 2006 annual bonus plan was based on a mix of Profit Before Tax (PBT) and Group Earnings Per Share (EPS) growth targets. For John White, Mike Farley and Mike Killoran, the PBT part of the annual bonus is based on being entitled to a fixed percentage of Group PBT, subject to a floor and a cap. For example, for the 2006 bonus plan John White was entitled to 0.133% of PBT, with a floor of £525m and a cap of £640m. A similar approach, based on PBT, also applied to the bonuses for Mike Farley and Mike Killoran. David Bryant was entitled to a percentage of the PBT of the Eastern Region. For the Group EPS part of the bonus, a more conventional approach has been taken with a sliding scale of EPS targets set around a target figure each year.

The following changes are proposed for the annual bonus plan for 2007, applicable to all of the executive Directors:

- The "percentage of PBT" approach has been discontinued as it provides relatively little differential in bonus payout between different performance outcomes. Instead, 50% of the bonus will be based on PBT targets (i.e. not divisional PBT for David Bryant since he is now predominately fulfilling solely a Group role). The remaining 50% will be based on EPS targets, as previously.
- Each year, the Committee will set an appropriate sliding scale around a target figure for both EPS and PBT. For the 2007 bonus, it is intended that, at threshold, 25% of the maximum bonus will be payable (threshold will not be less than 90% of the target). Two thirds of the maximum bonus will be payable at target and 100% of the bonus will be payable for a stretching outcome above target (generally in the range of +10%). A target level of bonus equivalent to two thirds of the maximum is considered appropriately challenging, recognising the high level of profitability of the Company and the stretching nature of the targets.

LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN

The existing LTIP (incorporating an individual limit of 100% of basic salary) will expire in 2008. In view of the short time to expiry, it is proposed that a new LTIP is introduced.

Full details of the proposed new LTIP are contained in the shareholder circular accompanying this year's Notice of Annual General Meeting. This is a relatively standard plan incorporating the latest best practice features. Whilst the plan rules will incorporate a degree of flexibility for the operation of the plan over its ten year life, key features of the policy for 2007 are summarised below:

- Initially, John White and Mike Farley will receive an award of 200% of basic salary (within a limit of 250% of salary), and Mike Killoran and David Bryant will receive an award equivalent to 150% of basic salary.
- As with the policy in previous years, awards will vest based on Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and Total Shareholder Return (TSR) targets. This provides a good blend between rewarding long term financial performance and superior stock market performance. However, it is proposed to make some changes to the structure of these targets in 2007. For grants under the LTIP in 2006, 50% of an award was based on TSR (versus 10 other housebuilders) with 40% of this part of the award vesting at median performance and all of this part of the award vesting for upper quartile performance. The remaining 50% of an award was based on ROCE performance, with 50% of this part of an award vesting for average annual ROCE of 13%, with all of this part of the award vesting for average annual ROCE of 20% (with intermediate steps between).
- For awards in 2007, the 50% of an award based on TSR performance will be measured against the constituents of the FTSE 100 Index (excluding Investment Trusts) as at the date of grant. The vesting schedule has been made steeper with 25% of an award (rather than 40%) vesting for median TSR performance. Full vesting will remain at the upper quartile. The FTSE 100 is considered to be a better benchmark against which to compare Persimmon's TSR as we believe there to be an insufficient number of large housebuilders to provide a robust comparator group and the sector may consolidate further. For the remaining 50% of an award based on ROCE targets, the lower and upper targets have been increased from 13% and 20% respectively to 15% and 22% respectively for between 25% and 100% of the award to vest. This range, in the view of the Committee, currently reflects the outlook for the Housebuilding Sector. For grants in future years, the Committee will review the ROCE range in the light of the outlook for the Housebuilding Sector at that time.

PENSION

The executive Directors are members of the Group's defined benefit pension scheme. Prior to 6 April 2006, all executive Directors accrued pension at a rate of 1/60th of basic salary. As Mike Killoran was subject to the pre 6 April 2006 HMRC earnings cap, he also received a contribution into a FURBs.

The normal retirement age for executive Directors is 60. John Millar who retired as a Director in April 2006 had an agreed retirement age of 62.

In early 2006 the Committee considered whether alternative remuneration should be provided to executive Directors in the event that they wished to stop accruing pension in the defined benefit pension scheme, as a result of the changes to pension legislation which became effective on 6 April 2006. When considering alternatives, the Committee agreed that any alternative arrangements should be cost neutral to the Company. The Committee further agreed that an executive Director who elected to cease further service in the Group's defined benefit scheme would receive a total salary supplement of 30% of basic salary, in lieu of all pension benefit.

Messrs White, Farley and Bryant elected to cease accruing further service and instead opted for the salary supplement (they will remain a member of the scheme for life insurance purposes). Mike Killoran elected to continue to accrue service.

The Committee has considered the impact of the significant salary increases on pension benefits accrued to 5 April 2006 under the final salary defined benefit pension scheme which is based on the final salary at the date of retirement. Therefore, recognising that it would be inappropriate to provide executives with the immediate benefit of this one-off significant salary increase on their accrued pension (yet at the same time acknowledging that it would be normal for accrued benefits to be based on final salary), a salary cap for pension purposes will be introduced.

John White and David Bryant will receive a 10% increase to their 2006 basic salary for pension purposes. Mike Farley will receive a 5% increase to his 2006 basic salary for pension purposes in view of the significant increase he received in 2006 on his appointment as Chief Executive. Mike Killoran's pension for service prior to 6 April 2006 will be linked to the earnings cap of £105,600 increased by 10% on 1 January 2007. The pensionable salary caps for Messrs White, Farley, Bryant and Killoran will increase thereafter annually by not more than 5% p.a. until retirement.

The Committee has decided that, from 6 April 2006, for future service only Mike Killoran should participate in the defined benefit scheme on an uncapped basis receiving benefits based on his basic salary.

These provisions will soften the impact of the significant salary increase on the level of historic pension benefit, whilst providing a fair outcome for executives who would normally have pension provision calculated using their final salary under such schemes (and taking into account that the salary level is no higher than market median levels).

BENEFITS IN KIND

In addition to the above, the executive Directors' remuneration also includes fully financed cars, membership of the Group private medical scheme and the Group income protection scheme, subscriptions and some telephone costs. These benefits are not pensionable.

ALL EMPLOYEE SHARE SCHEME

The executive Directors may also participate in the Company's Save as You Earn Scheme, which is open to all permanent employees who have more than six months' service.

SERVICE CONTRACTS

All executive Directors have service contracts and in line with the recommendations of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, the notice period for each executive Director does not exceed 12 months. The contracts expire on the Director's 60th birthday. In circumstances following a change of control, or where dismissed in breach of contract, an executive Director is entitled to payments for termination of employment, but in no circumstances will such payments exceed 12 months' remuneration. The executive Directors' contracts are all dated 24 April 2002 but are effective from 1 January 2002. None of the non-executive Directors have service contracts.

Mike Farley, David Bryant, Hamish Leslie Melville and Neil Davidson retire at the Annual General Meeting and are offering themselves for re-election.

SHARE OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES

The Committee has for some time encouraged significant long term share ownership of the Company's shares by the executive Directors. In order to comply with best practice, formal share ownership guidelines were established in 2002. As a result, the Committee now requires each executive Director to hold Persimmon shares. John White has to hold a minimum value of shares equivalent to three times his basic salary and all other executive directors were required to build and maintain shareholdings equivalent in value to two times their basic salary. In all cases the executive Directors' shareholdings are significantly in excess of the shareholding guideline.


The Committee recognises that executive Directors may be required to sell sufficient shares in the Company to satisfy any tax liability arising on the vesting of Bonus Shares or the exercise of options and vesting of awards granted under the Company's share option, LTIP and Synergy Incentive plans from time to time.

EXTERNAL APPOINTMENTS

None of the executive Directors currently has an external appointment. Should an executive wish to take up an external appointment, he must first seek approval from the Chairman and the Group Chief Executive.

PERFORMANCE GRAPH

Shown below is the Company's TSR performance against the FTSE 100 Index over the last five financial years. The Board has chosen this comparator as it is the benchmark for measuring the stock market performance of large UK listed companies. As the chart shows, the Company's performance has been outstanding, with the value of an investment in Persimmon shares on 31 December 2001 delivering a return of more than 4.5 times the original investment.



NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

Non-executive Directors do not have service contracts and are paid a fee which is non-pensionable. They do not qualify for performance related bonuses. The Board as a whole determines the fees of the non-executive Directors. Adam Applegarth, Hamish Leslie Melville and David Thompson received additional fees as Chairmen of the Remuneration and Audit Committees.

THE AUDITORS ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT ON THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE FOLLOWING PART OF THIS REPORT.

SCHEDULE OF DIRECTORS' EMOLUMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2006

	Salaries and fees [†] £	Performance related cash bonus ^Δ £	Benefits [○] £	Other emoluments [‡] £	Subtotal emoluments received £	Deferred bonus shares earned ^Δ £	2006 Total £	2005 Total £
Executive								
J White	407,425	860,000	45,939	101,077	1,414,441	770,892	2,185,333	2,191,805
M P Farley	355,933	746,668	36,945	86,978	1,226,524	552,975	1,779,499	1,436,687
M H Killoran	310,361	640,000	22,866	7,092	980,319	180,868	1,161,187	1,137,017
D G Bryant	222,662	442,712	34,230	55,239	754,843	–	754,843	731,845
J Millar*	97,067	298,000	11,675	13,641	420,383	–	420,383	1,229,024
Non-Executive								
D H Davidson**	56,667	–	10,568	–	67,235	–	67,235	201,428
Sir Chips Keswick***	13,333	–	–	–	13,333	–	13,333	40,000
I H Leslie Melville****	47,408	–	–	–	47,408	–	47,408	45,000
D G F Thompson	53,000	–	–	–	53,000	–	53,000	45,000
R C N Davidson	45,000	–	–	–	45,000	–	45,000	40,000
A J Applegarth	50,333	–	–	–	50,333	–	50,333	26,666
N Wrigley	41,251	–	–	–	41,251	–	41,251	Nil
Totals	1,700,440	2,987,380	162,223	264,027	5,114,070	1,504,735	6,618,805	7,124,472

[†]The Group's defined benefit pension scheme became non contributory on 1 August 2005. As a result the salaries paid to members of this scheme were reduced by 9% which would have been the member's rate of contribution to the scheme. Salary related benefits remain based on the headline salaries published on page 39.

^ΔThe performance-related bonus for 2006 (cash and deferred shares) has been paid as a result of the exceptional performance by reference to Group or divisional PBT and EPS. Once again, year-on-year profit has improved significantly. Notwithstanding this excellent performance, maximum bonus levels have not been payable. As set out in the policy section, annual bonus earned for 2006 in excess of 200% of basic salary is deferred in shares for up to two years.

[○]Benefits include payments made in lieu of a company car, in accordance with the Group policy for all company car drivers.

[‡]Other emoluments are salary supplements in lieu of pension benefits.

During the year no Director waived his entitlement to any emoluments.

*Mr J Millar, who retired as a Director on 30 April 2006 continued to be heavily involved in the Westbury integration in addition to his responsibilities associated with a number of major Group projects. Mr Millar received a salary and bonus for the remaining 8 months of the year of £375,982 and benefits of £18,615 in his capacity as a Group Special Projects Director. Mr Millar's responsibilities will reduce in 2007 with a commensurate reduction in remuneration.

**Mr D H Davidson retired as Chairman on 21 April 2006. In his capacity as Life President, for the remainder of 2006 he received a payment of £5,000 and benefits of £22,731.

***Sir Chips Keswick retired as a Director on 21 April 2006.

****Mr I H Leslie Melville's non-executive fees are paid in whole to Credit Suisse First Boston, his employing company.

Mr G Grewer, who retired as a Director on 31 December 2001 received £48,000 (2005: £40,000) for his role as Chairman of the Trustees of the Persimmon Plc Pension and Life Assurance Scheme.

DIRECTORS' PENSION ENTITLEMENTS

	Total accrued pension at 31 December 2005 £ pa	Total accrued pension at 31 December 2006 £ pa*	Increase in accrued pension £ pa	Increase in accrued pension (net of inflation) £ pa	Transfer value at 31 December 2005 £	Transfer value at 31 December 2006 £*	Increase in transfer value, less member contributions £	Transfer value of net of inflation increase in accrued pension less member contributions £
J White	211,556	240,463	28,907	21,291	3,508,526	4,116,902	591,176	356,130
M P Farley	133,778	151,666	17,888	13,073	2,035,184	2,420,757	372,773	199,180
M H Killoran	21,707	24,737	3,030	2,249	248,343	297,629	43,854	21,640
D G Bryant	98,856	109,252	10,396	6,838	1,580,453	1,814,805	224,952	106,240
J Millar	121,333	123,407	2,074	618	2,341,401	2,277,353	(73,748)	1,705

* The number for Mr J Millar is to 30 April 2006, the date he retired as a Director.

In addition to the above, the Directors received a salary supplement of 10% of basic salary (less a reduction for employer's NI) in lieu of a contribution to their complimentary pension plans. These payments are included in other emoluments on the table on the facing page. In 2005 the contributions were £43,000, £32,000, £89,600, £23,500 and £32,000 on behalf of Messrs White, Farley, Killoran, Bryant and Millar respectively.

BONUS SHARES

The interests of Directors in Bonus Shares are as shown below:

	1 January 2006	Awarded during year	Vested during year	31 December 2006
J White	238,461	68,311	162,730	144,042
M P Farley	132,985	35,580	91,731	76,834
M H Killoran	73,959	12,398	49,939	36,418
D G Bryant	30,744	150	20,979	9,915
Total	476,149	116,439	325,379	267,209

Bonus Shares are awarded on the announcement of the preliminary results. The proposed share awards in respect of the 2006 bonus for Messrs White, Farley and Killoran are 53,646, 38,481 and 12,586 respectively. The Bonus Share awards for 2006 were calculated at an average share price in the designated period of £14.37 (2005: £12.82) and are due to be awarded in March 2007. Bonus Shares vest over a two year period.

DIRECTORS' INTERESTS IN SHARES

The interests of Directors serving at the end of the year in the ordinary share capital of the Company are as shown below:

	Beneficial holdings		Share options/awards (excluding bonus shares)	
	31 December 2006	1 January 2006†	31 December 2006	1 January 2006
J White	1,949,644	1,266,943	525,640	200,855
M P Farley	893,911	800,620	310,632	179,881
M H Killoran	434,454	376,854	274,936	151,685
D G Bryant	470,842	428,524	123,418	118,895
I H Leslie Melville	150,000	200,000	–	–
D G F Thompson	30,596	30,007	–	–
R C N Davidson	38,350	2,850	–	–
A J Applegarth	3,642	–	–	–
N H T Wrigley	4,000	–	–	–
Total	3,975,439	3,105,798	1,234,626	651,316

† or subsequent date of appointment.

The Directors' beneficial holdings represent 1.3% of the Company's issued share capital as at 23 February 2007. D G F Thompson also has non-beneficial interests of 11,876 ordinary shares (2005: 11,582 ordinary shares). Otherwise all interests of the Directors are beneficial. There has been no change in the interests set out above between 31 December 2006 and 23 February 2007.

DIRECTORS' INTERESTS IN SHARE OPTIONS, LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN AND SYNERGY INCENTIVE PLAN AWARDS

	1 January 2006	Granted in year	Exercised in year	Lapsed in year	31 December 2006	Exercisable from	Expiry date	Performance condition end date	Exercise price/market price at date of award	Market price at date of exercise	Gain on exercise of option £
J White	82,278	–	82,278	–	–	Apr 06	Oct 06	Dec 05	395.0p	1,254p	1,031,766
	423 ⁽²⁾	–	423	–	–	Dec 06	May 07	–	436.0p	1,461p	4,336
	59,109	–	–	–	59,109	Mar 07	Sep 07	Dec 06	617.5p	–	–
	1,443 ⁽²⁾	–	–	–	1,443	Dec 07	May 08	–	525.0p	–	–
	57,602	–	–	–	57,602	Mar 08	Sep 08	Dec 07	746.5p	–	–
	–	32,306	–	–	32,306	Mar 09	Sep 09	Dec 08	1,331.0p	–	–
	–	93,750 ⁽³⁾	–	–	93,750	Feb 09	Aug 09	Dec 06	1,336.0p	–	–
	–	281,250 ⁽³⁾	–	–	281,250	Feb 10	Aug 10	Dec 07	1,336.0p	–	–
	–	180 ⁽²⁾	–	–	180	Dec 09	May 10	–	1,050.0p	–	–
Total	200,855	407,486	82,701	–	525,640						1,036,102
M P Farley	30,000 ⁽¹⁾	–	30,000	–	–	Apr 99	Apr 06	–	196.0p	1,389p	357,900
	63,291	–	63,291	–	–	Apr 06	Oct 06	Dec 05	395.0p	1,254p	793,669
	43,724	–	–	–	43,724	Mar 07	Sep 07	Dec 06	617.5p	–	–
	42,866	–	–	–	42,866	Mar 08	Sep 08	Dec 07	746.5p	–	–
	–	24,042	–	–	24,042	Mar 09	Sep 09	Dec 08	1,331.0p	–	–
	–	50,000 ⁽³⁾	–	–	50,000	Feb 09	Aug 09	Dec 06	1,336.0p	–	–
	–	150,000 ⁽³⁾	–	–	150,000	Feb 10	Aug 10	Dec 07	1,336.0p	–	–
Total	179,881	224,042	93,291	–	310,632						1,151,569
M H Killoran	63,291	–	63,291	–	–	Apr 06	Oct 06	Dec 05	395.0p	1,254p	793,669
	43,724	–	–	–	43,724	Mar 07	Sep 07	Dec 06	617.5p	–	–
	1,804 ⁽²⁾	–	–	–	1,804	Dec 07	May 08	–	525.0p	–	–
	42,866	–	–	–	42,866	Mar 08	Sep 08	Dec 07	746.5p	–	–
	–	24,042	–	–	24,042	Mar 09	Sep 09	Dec 08	1,331.0p	–	–
	–	40,625 ⁽³⁾	–	–	40,625	Feb 09	Aug 09	Dec 06	1,336.0p	–	–
	–	121,875 ⁽³⁾	–	–	121,875	Feb 10	Aug 10	Dec 07	1,336.0p	–	–
Total	151,685	186,542	63,291	–	274,936						793,669
D G Bryant	50,632	–	50,632	–	–	Apr 06	Oct 06	Dec 05	395.0p	1,253p	634,419
	34,979	–	–	–	34,979	Mar 07	Sep 07	Dec 06	617.5p	–	–
	1,804 ⁽²⁾	–	–	–	1,804	Dec 07	May 08	–	525.0p	–	–
	31,480	–	–	–	31,480	Mar 08	Sep 08	Dec 07	746.5p	–	–
	–	17,655	–	–	17,655	Mar 09	Sep 09	Dec 08	1,331.0p	–	–
	–	9,375 ⁽³⁾	–	–	9,375	Feb 09	Aug 09	Dec 06	1,336.0p	–	–
	–	28,125 ⁽³⁾	–	–	28,125	Feb 10	Aug 10	Dec 07	1,336.0p	–	–
Total	118,895	55,155	50,632	–	123,418						634,419
J Millar	63,291	–	–	–	63,291†	Apr 06	Oct 06	Dec 05	395.0p	–	–
	2,115 ⁽²⁾	–	–	–	2,115†	Dec 06	May 07	–	436.0p	–	–
	43,724	–	–	–	43,724†	Mar 07	Sep 07	Dec 06	617.5p	–	–
Total	109,130	–	–	–	109,130						–

⁽¹⁾ Persimmon Plc 1988 Executive Share Option Scheme.⁽²⁾ Persimmon Plc Save As You Earn Scheme.⁽³⁾ Persimmon Plc Synergy Incentive Plan (SIP).

† To 30 April 2006, for Mr J Millar.

All SIP awards are subject to a performance condition and will vest in two tranches. The performance condition for the first tranche of the SIP award has been met, as the Company has achieved synergy savings of c. £32m by the year ended 31 December 2006, which have been approved by the Audit and Remuneration Committees advised by external auditors. The awards will vest in February 2009.

Up to 75% of the total award (the "Second Tranche") will vest and become exercisable in February 2010 (or shortly after that), subject to the Company delivering between £40m and £48m of synergy savings in relation to the integration of Westbury into the Persimmon Group for the year ending 31 December 2007. The Committee requires John White to retain the SIP shares for the duration of his term as Chairman (except for sales of shares to pay income tax and National Insurance due on the exercise of the award).

Unless otherwise indicated, all of the above are awards of shares under the Persimmon Plc Long Term Incentive Plan 1998. Vesting of grants are subject to the achievement of performance conditions based on TSR relative to other housebuilders (median to upper quartile TSR for between 40% to 100% of this part of the award to vest) and a range of ROCE targets (13% to 20% for between 50% and 100% of this part of the award to vest).

2006 awards were made on 10 March 2006. All options and awards were granted for nil consideration. The performance conditions for LTIP awards made between 2002 and 2006 are shown on page 40.

Details of the market value of the Company's shares during 2006 were: price at 31 December 2006: 1,526p; lowest price in 2006: 1,097p; highest price in 2006: 1,526p.

Approved by the Board and Signed on its behalf by

Adam J Applegarth, Chairman Remuneration Committee
23 February 2007